Soviet Zone of Germany

The Soviet Zone of Germany has no air force similar to the air forces which exist in other satellite countries, however, reports received during the past year indicate that cadres of politically reliable East German youths were being organized and trained to form an Air Police in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Early in 1950 all Volkspolizei schools and Alert Police units were ordered to compile lists of all former German Air Force personnel. In mid-1950 the East German Administration for Labor ordered its regional officers to register all former Luftwaffe personnel. It appears that a headquarters element of the Luftpolizie (the air arm of the Volkpolizie) was established early in 1951. Firm evidence, however, is not available on the extent of the formation of an Air Police organization. In any event, it appears that such organization is in an embryonic stage. A cadre of politically reliable former Luftwaffe officers have been assigned to it. The number of aircraft and airfields assigned to the organization is not known. Training is believed to be in the early stages of implementation. Reports indicate the Air Police may be using Soviet and former German World War II aircraft types for training purposes. The possibility that pilots for the Air Police may be in training either in Poland or the Soviet Union should also be considered. A training course for glider instructors under sponsorship of the Free German Youth (FDJ), the official East German youth organization, has been reported with attendance almost exclusively from the Volkspolizei. The FDJ, through its glider training schools, undoubtedly could be able to furnish an organized, partly trained, politically reliable manpower for an Air Police or a similar organization. An Air Police in time probably could be rapidly expanded into a formal Air Force since it has or will have access to a considerable number of partly or wholly trained personnel from the FDJ, the Volkspolizei, and former Luftwaffe pilots and groundcrews. An Air Police would serve as the air supplement to the existing Alert Police ground and Maritime Police units, thereby providing the final necessary component for a future formal armed force in East Germany.

Shelby - U.S.

The most extensive airfield construction of any of the Satellite countries is in progress in this zone. In addition to extension of existing

runways and building new long runways, a widespread program of rehabilitation and construction of hangars, personnel accomodations, and fuel tank installations is being pursued. The Soviet Zone of Germany, has at present seven airfields capable of supporting sustained heavy bomber/medium bomber operations with permanent runways in excess of 7,000 feet; thirteen airfields are suitable for limited heavy bomber/medium bomber operations. Another fourteen fields have runways of 6,000 feet or more. The runways of seven other fields are being lengthened to 6,000 feet and possibly 8,200 feet. The Soviets have a total of fifty two airfields in this zone. The airfield improvement program surpasses the requirements of aircraft types currently based in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and can be expected to continue at the same pace through 1952.

The Hungarian Air Force, reactivated in April 1948, is an autonomous service on the same level as the Army. Its mission is to provide tactical air support for the Hungarian ground forces and to defend the country against aerial attack. The Air Force is believed to have about 340 aircraft, an increase of 180 over January 1950. The number of tactical aircraft available to the H.A.F.'s mission has increased since January 1950 from 86 to 235, while the number of tactical units has approximately doubled and now consist of two fighter regiments, two attack regiments, and a reconnaissance squadron. The H.A.F. has no bomber units. The U.S.S.R. has recently supplied Hungary with approximately 100 YAK-9's and 100 IL-10's. It is not believed that the acquisition of these aircraft has yet produced a significant change in the low combat capability of the Hungarian Air Force. The present combat value of the H.A.F. is considered to be low in relation to the air forces of neighboring states and as a contributing satellite of the U.S.S.R. The low level of training and frequent purges of qualified personnel have reduced the efficiency of the organization. Personnel strength has increased to about 5700 officers and enlisted from the estimated 2500 officers and enlisted personnel in January 1950.

The Hungarian Air Force, which hitherto has received relatively little Soviet attention now appears to be undergoing rapid build-up. With continued logistical support by the Soviets the combat effectiveness of the H.A.F. can be expected to improve through 1952.

Equipment

Current H.A.F. equipment consists primarily of Soviet World War II type aircraft. The 100 YAK-9's recently received are believed to be aircraft reconditioned subsequent to being replaced with jet aircraft in the Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army in Germany. Since January 1950 the H.A.F.'s IL-2 attack aircraft have been replaced by the higher performance IL-10's. The Hungarian budgetary appropriations for the purchase of aircraft and the maintenance of airfields have been increased from $110,000 in 1950 to $4,000,000 in 1951. The aircraft strength has been more than doubled since January 1950. The serviceability of aircraft is believed to be fair with continued improvement expected through 1952 as additional qualified personnel are trained.

Air Facilities

Airfield construction since 1949 has greatly increased Hungary's airfield potential, and the planned building program is believed to be nearing completion. Of the 27 air facilities in Hungary, five have permanent runways of more than 8,000 feet, one has a natural surfaced runway of more than 7,000 feet, and still another has a natural surfaced runway of more than 6,000 feet. Construction in progress will provide an additional field with a permanent runway of 8,000 feet. The airfield improvement program surpasses the requirements of aircraft types currently based in Hungary. It is expected that future efforts will be devoted to making field installations and improving airfield facilities.

Air Defense

There are indications of a planned program of air defense in Hungary. This has taken on the appearance of a slow but steady effort and is believed to be in the early stage of development. Little is known of the air warning system. However, a network of spotters is believed to exist on the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers. Plan is being implemented to ring the Budapest area with AA installations, searchlights, and radar. American World War II early warning and ground control intercept radars were recently observed on an airfield used as a Hungarian Air Force training base. Any improvement of the Hungarian air defense capability will depend upon the degree of assistance received from the U.S.S.R.

Training and Political Reliability

Extensive training is being conducted for pilots and a parallel course of instruction is being given enlisted personnel. A substantial number of H.A.F. pilots have received jet aircraft transitional training in the U.S.S.R. The current level of proficiency however is considered low because the pilots have had limited experience in tactical aircraft. Operational units are not fully qualified. The H.A.F. was seen operating with ground forces for the first time in the autumn of 1950. The political reliability of the H.A.F. is believed to be relatively high as a result of frequent purges and continuing political indoctrination. Emphasis on political indoctrination and improvement of combat efficiency is expected to continue through 1952.

SECRET

Status of Soviet Control and Direction

Soviet personnel are serving with the Hungarian Air Force at the top levels of command, and are possibly serving in an advisory capacity in the lower echelons. This supervision by the Soviets can be expected to continue through 1952.

Present and Future Degree of Efficiency, Dependability and Capabilities of the Hungarian Air Force.

The number of aircraft and tactical units in the Hungarian Air Force has increased considerably since January 1950. Significantly, the airfield construction program in this Satellite is nearing completion. Just recently the Soviets have supplied 100 fighter and 100 ground attack aircraft to the H.A.F. However, these factors have not yet produced a significant change in the low combat value of the H.A.F. an intensive training program is underway, both well-rounded pilot and groundcrew training program is being aggressively pursued. This training program is expected to appreciably raise by 1952 the present low combat effectiveness, both offensive and defensive, of the H.A.F. As in all Satellite, nations, however, the future capability of this air force will depend to a great extent upon the amount of assistance furnished by the U.S.S.R.

Military Program for War Readiness.

While efforts are being made to increase the combat efficiency of the Hungarian Air Force, there are no indications of any intention to achieve war readiness by an early date. If such intentions do exist, the emphasis appears on a defensive rather than an offensive role for the Hungarian Air Force.

SECRET

Hungary

Table I

Summary of Aircraft Strengths

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	--	--
Conventional	145*	Yak-9
Attack	90	IL-10
Light Bomber	--	--
Medium Bomber	--	--
Transport	4	LI-2
Reconnaissance	--	--
Trainers	16	YAK-18
	5	C-47
	7	Yak-9
	4	Yak-11
	12	IL-10
	6	ZLIN
Miscellaneous	3	Aero-45
	12	AradO-96
	3	Kanya
	32	UT-2
	4	Bucher
TOTAL	343	

* 100 of these delivered in early 1951. Assignment unreported.

SECRET

HUNGARY

TABLE II

SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION OF TACTICAL UNITS AND MISSION AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

UNIT	MISSION AIRCRAFT	LOCATION
Hq Tactical Air Division		Budapest
Ftr Regt	12 Yak-9	Tokol
Ftr Regt	30 Yak-9	Veszprem
G/A Regt	30 IL-10	Tokol
G/A Regt	30 IL-10	Veszprem
Reconn Sqdn	? Yak-9	Szekesfehervar
Potential Mission a/c	103 Yak-9	
	30 IL-10	
TOTAL	235	

TABLE III

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	Officer	Enlisted	TOTAL
Pilots	260	400	660
Other aircrew	--	240	240
Other	446	4391	4837
TOTAL	706	5031	5737

I. Military Strengths and Weaknesses

A. Current Strength of the Air Force.

Poland has the most effective air force of the European Satellites countries. The aircraft are better maintained and the Polish Air Force receives relatively better logistic support from the USSR than do the other Western Satellites. The Air Force, and independent force on the same organizational level as the Army and Navy, has approximately 520 aircraft compared to about 440 in January 1950. The current total personnel strength is approximately 9,500, a slight increase over the January 1950 figure, including Soviet personnel who are serving as members of the P.A.F. The present strength is considered to be its current maximum mobilization potential. The reserve system, which appears to be presently in the planning stage, consists of numerous air force sponsored paramilitary organizations and the "company" schools for reserve officers' training.

The combat value of the P.A.F. would be good in the role of home defense. The acquisition of 40 jet fighters from the USSR in the spring of 1951 and the activation of a new air defense fighter unit has undoubtedly increased this capability.

Poland also has a small Naval Air Arm, organized into one naval air regiment directly subordinate to the Chief of the Polish Navy. It has about 50 aircraft and 1200 personnel, an increase over the approximately 300 personnel and a dozen aircraft in January 1950.

Improvement of combat efficiency and political indoctrination of personnel in both the Air Force and the Naval Air Arm are expected to be emphasized through 1952 in conjunction with continued Soviet logistical support.

B. Current Status of Equipment.

The P.A.F. is believed to have received 36 Type 16 jet fighters and four Type 26 (two-place jet transitional trainers) from the Soviets. Other P.A.F. fighter units are equipped with Yak-9P aircraft, a type which became operational in the Soviet Air Force in 1946. The majority of the light bombers

are Pe-2's which were operational in 1942 although the P.A.F. is believed to have six TU-2's, a modern Soviet medium bomber. The P.A.F.'s IL-2 attack aircraft, operational in 1941, are being replaced with IL-10's, operational in 1944.

Equipment of the Naval Air Arm includes TU-2's, IL-10's and Yak-9P's.

POLISH AIR FORCE

SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	36	Type-16
Conventional	170	Yak-9P
Attack	125	IL-10
	15	IL-2
Light Bomber	53	PE-2
	6	TU-2
Medium Bomber	--	----
Transport	6	C-47
	6	LI-2
	2	IL-12
Reconnaissance	10	PO-2
	2	FI-156
	6	Siebel
Trainers	4	Type-26 (two place jet)
	50	PO-2
	20	UT-2
Miscellaneous	6	Siebel
	2	FI-156
TOTAL	519	

POLISH NAVAL AIR ARM

Fighter		
Jet	--	----
Conventional	12	Yak-9
Attack	10	IL-10
	10	IL-2
Light Bomber	10	PE-2
	2	TU-2
Medium Bomber	--	----
Transport	--	----
Reconnaissance	8	PO-2
Trainers	--	----
Miscellaneous	--	----
TOTAL	42	

1. Changes since 1 January 1950.

The assignment of jet fighters, IL-10 attack aircraft and TU-2 bombers to the P.A.F. has taken place since 1 January 1950.

2. Changes Likely to Occur Through 1951.

It is probable that the Soviets will continue this re-equipment program through 1952. The fact that the Polish Air Force is receiving some of the better performing aircraft is an indication of the importance of Poland in Soviet Planning.

C. Status of Air Facilities.

The airfield development program which the Soviets have been conducting throughout the Satellites since the end of World War II has brought two formerly unimportant Polish airfields, Stolp/Reitz and Praust, into prominence. These air facilities are or will be, capable of supporting sustained jet-interceptor operations. They are also potential heavy and medium bomber airfields. Warsaw/Bornerowo, with a runway more than 8,000 feet long has been completed. Poland now has a total of 88 air facilities, but only seven have runways 5,000 feet or longer. Six seaplane stations are not active although an occasional aircraft is seen at one. It is probable that air facility improvement work will be vigorous in Poland through 1952.

D. Status of Air Defense

Air defense in Poland is a joint responsibility of the Polish Air Force and the new Polish air defense organization, O.P.L., which was authorized in February 1950. The O.P.L. has demonstrated marked similarity to the P.V.O. system of the USSR. Although there is no information available concerning coordination between O.P.L. and P.V.O., the presence of Soviet military personnel in O.P.L. command and staff positions indicates that it will be close. Heretofore, the Polish forces have played practically no part in the air defense of Poland, primarily because of equipment and limitations. Activation of new anti-aircraft artillery units, believed supplied and trained by Headquarters, Artillery, Polish Army, have been reported. Anti-aircraft artillery equipment includes the Soviet 37 mm, 76.2 mm, and 85 mm guns. Fire-control equipment, including radar, has been observed.

There is no known Polish warning or intercept system in operation. With the exception of a few radar units apparently used by the Polish Air Force for training purposes, all radar in Poland is under the direct control of Soviet units. Any warning system, visual or electronic, in operation in Poland is probably tied in with existing telecommunications systems and would be controlled by the Soviets. The north and east approaches to Poland are covered by Soviet radar warning systems in Germany and on the Baltic Coast.

The assignment of jet fighters and modern ground equipment to Poland along with other measures indicates that the Soviets are taking forceful steps to build up the Polish air defense capabilities. This program is expected to be maintained through 1952.

E. Status of Training and Political Reliability.

The Polish Air Force is apparently considered politically reliable by the Soviets following frequent purges to remove personnel considered unreliable. Soviet personnel have been integrated into the P.A.F. which assists in its close supervision and absolute control by the Russians. Air training is completely dominated by the Soviets. The proficiency of Polish airmen exceeds that of the other European Satellites but below that of the Soviets. Training production is believed adequate for present requirements and is capable of considerable expansion. Propaganda occupies a large portion of the training agenda as political indoctrination continues to be emphasized. It appears that the Soviets are making a decided effort to boost Polish morale and gain valuable allies by stimulating trust and respect for the Soviet Air Force, increasing training, and assigning responsible tasks to the Polish Air Force.

F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.

The Polish Air Force is under the absolute domination and control of the Soviets. Compared to other European Satellite air forces, it has an abnormally high percentage of Soviet Air Force personnel serving in its ranks. The integration of Soviet officers extends from the Commander, Polish Air Force, all the way down to the squadron commanders and pilots. A large percentage of the enlisted men are also former Soviet airmen. The commander of the Polish Air Force is directly responsible to the Marshal of Poland, Konstanty K. Rokossovski, a well-known Soviet officer. Integration of Soviet personnel into the Air Force will be continued through 1952 to the extent the Soviet considers necessary to retain control and domination.

G. PRESENT AND FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF ACTIVITY, DEPENDABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE POLISH AIR FORCE.

The Polish air force is the most effective of the European Satellite Air Forces. The P.A.F. receives relatively better logistic support from the USSR than do the other Western Satellites. Any estimate of the capabilities of the Polish Air Force must take into consideration the factor of U.S.S.R. assistance. Its capability in the future will depend in large measure on the degree of support supplied by the Soviets. The present combat value of the Polish Air Force would be relatively good in the role of home defense. The acquisition of 40 jet fighters in the spring of 1951 and the activation of a new air defense organization has increased this capability. Offensively, the P.A.F. would be fairly effective against such a minor power as Yugoslavia but would be completely outclassed by Sweden. The Soviets would probably hesitate to use the Poles in an agressive role because of the political reliability question. It is more likely that the trend is toward creating in the Polish Air Force a valuable adjunct for the air defense of the USSR and the Baltic areas under its control.

H. MILITARY PROGRAM FOR WAR READINESS.

While efforts are being made to increase the combat efficiency of the Polish Air Force, there are no indications of any intention to achieve war readiness by an early date. If such intentions do exist, the emphasis appears on a defensive rather than an offensive role for the Polish Air Force.

SECRET

RUMANIA

I. MILITARY STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES.

A. Current Strength of the Air Force.

The combat value of the Rumanian Air Force is limited in comparison to neighboring countries and its contribution as an ally of the U.S.S.R. would be negligible. Its strength consists of approximately 330 World War II type aircraft and 12,000 officers and men. The aircraft and personnel strength has not changed significantly since January 1950. The air force, however, has been in the process of reorganization under Soviet direction since that time. This has included the adoption of Soviet tactical organization, training procedures and combat procedures. It may be expected that the revitalization program will continue during 1952 and that higher performance aircraft will be furnished by the Soviets as soon as they consider it expedient to do so.

B. Current and Future Status of Equipment.

Although aircraft equipment is predominantly of Soviet design, it also consists of German and Rumanian types. Fighter aircraft in operational units, for example, are believed to consist of 40 ME-109G's (German), 32 Yak-9's (Soviet) and 25 IAR-80 (Rumanian). Other aircraft in the force have a similar performance level. Maintenance and serviceability are low due to continual purges of personnel and the failure of the Soviets to provide adequate logistic support. The situation surrounding equipment has not changed significantly since 1950. In view of the assistance the Soviets are beginning to give other Western Satellites, however, it may be that they will initiate some build-up of the Rumanian force by the end of 1952.

AIR FACILITIES:

Rumania has 52 airfields and seaplane stations but only one of them has permanent runways 6,000 feet long or longer. Lack of hard-surfaced runways and taxiways limits their potential for year-around operation.

An extensive runway construction program has been initiated since 1950, however and this airfield development program is likely to be continued through 1952.

AIR DEFENSE:

At present, Rumania is without an effective air defense system, and the situation has not changed a great deal since January 1950. Reliance upon visual and sonic methods of early warning continues. Antiaircraft artillery has been undergoing expansion for some time, however, in the Rumanian army. In the past nine months, gun defenses have been established in the Ploesti and Bucharest areas and increased air raid precautions, such as the building of shelters and the organization of civil defense, have been taken. Any significant improvement in the Rumanian air defense capability through 1952 will depend upon the assistance supplied by the Soviets. During World War II, the Germans established extensive radar defense networks in Rumania, primarily for the protection of the Ploesti oil fields. Many of the operative and maintenance personnel were Rumanian. With the end of the war, however, the equipment fell into disuse.

TRAINING AND POLITICAL RELIABILITY:

Training within the Rumanian Air Force is believed to be increasing in tempo. Recently 18 officers of this force were reported to have begun training by the Soviets in jet aircraft. The tactical organization, training procedures and combat doctrines in the R. A. F. follow those of the U. S. S. R. Like other Satellites, purges since World War II of capable officers and men considered unreliable have reduced the efficiency of the R. A. F. The degree of the political reliability of the R. A. F. is not known but the stepped up training suggest that it is considered improved by the Soviets. Emphasis on training and political indoctrination probably can be expected through 1952.

SOVIET CONTROL AND DIRECTION:

Soviet Air Force personnel are on duty with the Rumanian Air Force throughout the various sections of the high command and probably with the training establishments and tactical units down to Division level. Soviet personnel function as advisers to the R. A. F. section heads and commanders and undoubtedly have a great deal of authority. The situation surrounding Soviet control and direction has changed little since January 1950 and the Soviets are expected to maintain their close supervision.

G. PRESENT AND FUTURE DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY, DEPENDABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE RUMANIAN AIR FORCE.

Present confirmed information indicates the combat value of Rumanian Air Force is extremely limited. The Air Force was reliably reported to have undergone a large-scale reorganization in January, 1951, involving the activation of many new units and the introduction of Soviet medium bombers and jet fighters. Because of many inconsistencies in the report and the absence of any confirming evidence, this information is mentioned only as a possibility. The amount of Soviet support is the key to the future capability of this Satellite Air Force. Present confirmed evidence indicates its capability has not changed significantly since 1950. The R.A.F.'s effectiveness appears negligible offensively and low defensively.

H. MILITARY PROGRAM FOR WAR READINESS.

The Rumanian military program does not indicate any intention to achieve war readiness by an early date.

RUMANIAN AIR FORCE

TABLE I

SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	—	—
Conventional	40	ME-109G
	50	Yak-9
Attack	30	IL-2
	25	IAR-80
	15	IAR-81
Light Bomber	15	PE-2
Medium Bomber	—	—
Transport	5	JU-52
	5	SM-79
	5	C-60
Reconnaissance	30	PO-2
	10	FI-156
	25	IAR-39
Trainers	20	Yak-11
	20	PO-2
Miscellaneous	15	Nardi-305
	5	Fi-58
	3	JU-88
	15	Zlin
Total	333	

RUMANIAN AIR FORCE

TABLE II

SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION OF TACTICAL UNITS AND MISSION AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

UNIT	MISSION AIRCRAFT	LOCATION
1st Air Division		Bucharest
1st Ftr Regt	13 ME-109-G 16 Yak-9	Bucharest/Ripeura
2nd Ftr Regt	13 ME-109-G 16 Yak-9	Craiova
3rd Ftr Regt	14 Me-109-G Unknown (probably Yak-9	Targsorul Nou
2nd Air Div		Brasov
4th G/A Regt	25 IAR-80 7 PE-2	Galati
5th Rcn Regt	30 PO-2	Turda & Mamaia
6th Bmr Regt	30 IL-2	Brasov & Craiova
7th Air Regt	--	Galati
8th Trans Regt	5 JU-52 5 SM-79 5 C-60	
9th Liaison Regt	10 FI-156	
Potential Mission a/c	18 Yak-9 15 IAR-81 8 PE-2	
Total	230	

TABLE III

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Personnel all categories	12,040 (Estimated)

PART II: THE SATELLITES AS A COLLECTIVE UNIT.

I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THE SATELLITES AS A COLLECTIVE MILITARY INSTRUMENT?

A. There is no evidence of any attempt by the USSR to organize and coordinate the Satellite Air Forces as a unit and no evidence of joint maneuvers among the Satellites. However there is a similarity in organization. Some satellite Air Forces are a component part of the army while others share equal status. All are controlled by Soviet Air Force advisers if not actually directly commanded by Soviet Air Force officers. Of interest is that all Satellite Air Forces are now using Soviet training manuals.

The equipment in the Satellite Air Forces has not been completely standardized up to now but the influx in the past nine months has shown a tendency to standardize the fighter regiments with Yak 9's, the ground assault regiments with IL-10's and the light bomber regiments with Pe-2 and Tu-2's. By 1952 all Satellite Air Forces are expected to be standardized.

Although the Satellite Air Forces have been politically conditioned it is doubtful at the present time that they could operate as a unified force. Little information is available on the nature and estimated capability of the reported inter-satellite organized guerrilla force. Major problems that the USSR would face in attempting to use Satellite Forces collectively are (1) Language difficulty. (2) Problem of cooperation due to nationalist feelings. (3) Standardization of equipment has not improved enough as yet to solve the problems of serviceability.